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Abstract 
The US imposed US tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in March 2018. An estimate 
of the economic impact of tariff hikes made using a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model of global trade, incorporating a dynamic capital formation mechanism, 
indicates that US import tariffs could protect the relevant US sectors but would have a 
negative impact on the US economy at the macro level. This key policy finding could not 
be attributed to the conventional framework of fixed labor in a CGE model. Also, a 
sensitivity analysis using a CGE model indicates that international capital movements 
would differentiate the impact of tariff hikes among countries. Trade deficits themselves 
would not necessarily be of much concern given the somewhat compensatory benefits of 
international capital inflows. On the other hand, possible capital outflows could 
exaggerate the adverse effects of tariff hikes. It is estimated here that for an import tariff 
hike of one percentage point worldwide, global trade would decrease by around 1.7 per 
cent and global GDP would decrease by around 0.2 per cent. It is of concern that emergent 
protectionism would reduce the growth of both global trade and the global economy. 
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1 This paper is a substantially extended and updated version of Kawasaki (2018). 
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Economic Impact of Tariff Hikes 
- A CGE model analysis - 
 
 
 I. Introduction 
 
 US President Trump issued a presidential proclamation on March 8, 2018 
imposing a 25 per cent tariff on US steel imports and a 10 per cent tariff on aluminum 
imports. The White House Fact Sheets stated that “President Trump is taking action to 
protect America’s critical steel and aluminum industries, which have been harmed by 
unfair trade practices and global excess capacity.”2 As of June 1, 2018, these tariffs apply 
to US steel imports from all countries except Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Korea and 
to US aluminum imports from all countries except Argentina and Australia. 
 
 In the meantime, on April 2, 2018 China increased by 15-25 per cent its tariffs 
on 128 import products from the US, including fruit, wine, pork products and stainless 
steel. The US trade deficit with China constitutes nearly 50 per cent of the total US trade 
deficit. In that light, the focus here is on developments related to Chinese trade policy 
measures. 
 
 Emergent uncertainty caused by the UK’s June 2016 decision to leave the EU 
and the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017 appears 
to have eased somewhat during 2017. This impression is supported by the agreement 
concluded by the eleven members (excluding the US) of the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Japan-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). However, there is a need to monitor 
developments in global trade policy making, including protectionism movement on the 
one hand, and the progress of regional integration on the other. 
 
 In this paper, the economic impact of tariff hikes is evaluated by means of 
simulation analysis using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of global 
trade incorporating a dynamic capital formation mechanism. After a brief look at US trade 
developments in Chapter II and a description of the analytical data and model in Chapter 
III, the estimated impact of tariff hikes is discussed in Chapter IV. The sensitivity of the 
dynamic framework of CGE models is explored, along with the effects of endogenous 
                                                   
2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-addressing-unfair-
trade-practices-threaten-harm-national-security/ 
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labor supply, in Chapter V. Conclusions are drawn in Chapter VI. 
 
 
 II. The development of US trade 
 
 The US recorded a trade deficit amounting to 796 billion US dollars in 2017, 
eight times larger than that in 1990 (102 billion US dollars). That said, the expansion of 
Chart 1 Trends in US trade deficits
Source: “Foreign Trade,” The U.S. Census Bureau, The U.S. Department of Commerce
             “World Economic Outlook Database (April 2018 edition),” IMF
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World China EU Japan(% of GDP)
(Billion US dollars)
Exports Imports Total trade Balance
World 1,547 2,343 3,890 -796
China 130 506 636 -375
Japan 68 137 204 -69
Korea 48 71 119 -23
ASEAN 78 170 248 -92
India 26 49 74 -23
Australia 25 10 35 15
New Zealand 4 4 8 0
EU 284 435 718 -151
Russia 7 17 24 -10
Canada 282 300 582 -18
Mexico 243 314 557 -71
Argentina 10 5 14 5
Brazil 37 29 67 8
Source: “Foreign Trade,” The U.S. Census Bureau, The U.S. Department of Commerce
Table 1-A US trade by country (2017)
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those trade deficits looks moderate in relative terms rather than as absolute values. The 
US trade deficit to GDP ratio has been around 4 per cent during the 2010s, which is more 
than twice that in the 1990s but less than its peak of 6.0 per cent in 2006, immediately 
before the global financial crisis (see Chart 1). 
 
 As for trade partner sources of the US trade deficit, Japan had the largest US 
trade deficit in the early 1990s, accounting for around 50 per cent of total US trade deficit. 
However, at present the largest share is held by China, with nearly 50 per cent of the total 
US trade deficit in 2017, as discussed above. Japan’s share has been around 10 per cent 
throughout the 2010s. Meanwhile, the EU as a whole has seen its share rising to the 
current level of around 20 per cent. 
 
 The structure of US trade in 2017 is shown by country in Table 1-A, and by 
commodity in Table 1-B. The three largest destinations of US exports are the EU, Canada 
and Mexico, followed by China. On the other hand, the largest source of US imports is 
China, followed by the EU, then Canada and Mexico. What is striking is the fact that US 
imports from China are nearly four times larger than US exports to China. US imports 
from Asia, including Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 
(Billion US dollars)
Exports Imports Balance
Total 1,547 2,343 -796
Food and Live Animals  99 106 -7
Beverages and Tobacco 6 25 -19
Animal and Vegetables Oils 3 7 -4
Crude Materials Except Fuels 77 34 43
Mineral Fuels and Lubricants 136 195 -59
Chemicals and Related Products 194 221 -27
Manufactured Goods by Material 106 256 -150
  Iron and steel 15 37 -22
  Nonferrous metals 14 42 -28
  Manufactures of metals 25 53 -28
Machinery and Transport Equipment 502 1,015 -513
  Telecommunications equipment 22 168 -146
  Electrical machinery 78 176 -98
  Road vehicles 117 286 -170
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 120 381 -262
Miscellaneous Commodities 65 103 -38
Re-Exports 239 0 239
Table 1-B US trade by commodity (2017)
Source: “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services Report,” The U.S.
Census Bureau, The U.S. Department of Commerce
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average, and India are also about double US exports to those countries. The US trade 
deficit is for the most part accounted for by China (around 50 per cent), the EU (around 
20 per cent) and Japan, ASEAN and Mexico (about 10 per cent each). 
 
 By commodity, the US trade deficit in metals (iron and steel, nonferrous metals 
and manufacture of metals) accounts for around 10 per cent of the US total trade deficit. 
Much larger trade deficits are recorded for machinery and transportation equipment 
including telecommunications equipment; electrical machinery; and road vehicles. 
Meanwhile, relatively large trade deficits are also indicated for mineral fuels and 
lubricants. On the other hand, exports and imports are almost balanced for agricultural 
commodities including food, unlike manufactured goods. 
 
 
 III. Analytical data and model 
 
 The economic impact of tariff hikes is estimated here using the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) database3 version 10 (beta version) and a static version of the 
GTAP model. 
                                                   
3 An overview of the earlier GTAP database version 9 is available in Aguiar, A., B. Narayanan 
and R. McDougall (2016). 
Countries and Regions Commodities
JPN Japan AGR Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
CHN China MNG Minerals
KOR Korea PFD Processed foods
ASA ASEAN TXL Textiles and wearing apparel 
IND India CHM Chemical products
AUS Australia MTL Metals
NZL New Zealand MVH Motor vehicles and parts
OAO Other Asia and Oceania ELE Electronic equipment
USA US OME Other machinery and equipment
CAN Canada OMF Other manufacturing
MEX Mexico CNS Construction
ARG Argentina EGW Electricity, gas and water
BRA Brazil T_T Transportation
OAM Other America OSP Other private services
EUM EU OSG Public services
RUS Russia
ROW Rest of the world
Source: Author based on GTAP database version 10
Table 2 Regional and commodity aggregations
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 The trade and economic data of version 10 of the GTAP database are 
benchmarked to year 2014. In this paper, those data are used as is, without updating. 
Countries are aggregated to form 17 regions. The ASEAN countries4 are aggregated into 
one region 5  as are the EU countries including the UK. On the other hand, certain 
countries were once exempted from the US metal tariff hikes; they are individually 
disaggregated (see Table 2). Commodities are aggregated to 15 major sectors, reflecting 
the structure of US trade. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries are aggregated into one sector. 
Ferrous metals, other metals and metal products are also aggregated into one sector. On 
the other hand, motor vehicles and parts, and electronic equipment are kept separate from 
other machinery and equipment. 
 
 According to the GTAP website, 
“The standard GTAP Model is a multiregion, multisector, computable general 
equilibrium model, with perfect competition and constant returns to scale. 
Innovative aspects of this model include: … Bilateral trade is handled via the 
Armington assumption. … A global banking sector which intermediates between 
global savings and consumption.”6 
 
 Several closure options are available in the GTAP model. In this paper, trade 
balance is not fixed. This means capital balance is also endogenous, which allows 
international capital movement, and the expected rates of return on capital are equalized 
across the regions. Moreover, capital stock is endogenous: this introduces dynamic capital 
accumulation effects into the standard static version of the model, which links changes in 
investment to capital stock. On the other hand, labor supply is still exogenous in the major 
model simulations in this paper. The sensitivity of endogenous labor supply is 
investigated separately. 
 
 
 IV. The impact of tariff hikes 
 
 1) The impact of US metal tariff hikes 
 
 Prior to the announcement by the US President that tariffs would be imposed on 
steel and aluminum imports, the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) investigated the 
                                                   
4 This is composed of nine ASEAN member countries (not including Myanmar, whose data is 
not individually available in the current GTAP database). 
5 Two regions, each composed of more than one country, export to and import from their own 
regions. 
6 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp 
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effect of US imports of steel and aluminum on US national security under section 232 of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. USDOC (2018a), reporting an investigation of the 
effect of steel imports, stated that: 
“… the Secretary of Commerce concludes that the present quantities and 
circumstance of steel imports are “weakening our internal economy” and 
threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section 232.” and, 
“… the Secretary recommends that the President take immediate action by 
adjusting the level of these imports through quotas or tariffs. The quotas or tariffs 
imposed should be sufficient, even after any exceptions (if granted), to enable 
U.S. steel producers to operate at an 80 percent or better average capacity 
utilization rate based on available capacity in 2017….” (p. 5-6). 
 
 USDOC (2018a) described alternative measures on all imported steel products, 
as below. 
- 63 per cent quota on imports from all countries 
- 24 per cent tariff on imports from all countries 
- 53 per cent tariff on imports from “a subset of countries”7 
It is estimated that “According to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Model, 
produced by Purdue University, a 24 percent tariff on all steel imports would be expected 
to reduce imports by 37 percent…” (p. 8), and that other above measures would have 
equivalent impact on US steel imports. 
 
 Meanwhile, USDOC (2018b), investigating the effect of aluminum imports, 
described the following alternatives measures stating that: 
“… the quotas or tariffs would be designed, even after any exemptions (if 
granted), to enable U.S. aluminum production to utilize an average of 80 percent 
of production capacity” (p. 6). 
- 86.7 per cent quota on imports from all counties 
- 7.7 per cent tariff on imports from all countries 
- 23.6 per cent tariff on imports from “a subset of countries”8 
 
 In this paper, the impact of tariff hikes on US imports of all metal and metal 
products from all countries are estimated. This simulation somehow exaggerates the 
actual impact of US steel and aluminum tariff hikes. The simulation assumes that tariffs 
would be hiked by 25 per cent (higher than the 10 per cent tariff on aluminum) on all 
metal and metal products, rather than on steel and aluminum alone and from all countries, 
                                                   
7 “Brazil, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, India, Vietnam, China, Thailand, South Africa, Egypt, 
Malaysia and Costa Rica” (USDOC 2018a p. 8). 
8 “China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam” (USDOC 2018b p. 8). 
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not excluding the exempted countries9 discussed above. The main purpose of this paper 
is to study the broad perspective of the economic impact of tariff hikes rather than 
focusing on the precise magnitude of US steel and aluminum tariff measures. 
 
 If the US were to impose an additional 25 per cent import tariff on all metal and 
metals products from all countries, it is estimated that US imports of metal and metal 
products would decrease by 45.9 per cent. The US metal trade balance would improve by 
59.4 billion US dollars and US metal production would increase by 9.0 per cent (see Table 
3-A).  
 
 That said, other sectors, in particular those that use metals as input materials, 
would likely lose international competitiveness due to rising production costs. US exports 
of autos, electronics, and other machinery are estimated to decrease by 3.4 per cent, 5.1 
per cent, 5.8 per cent respectively. US imports of other sectors would also increase in 
general. The improvement of the US trade balance for all industries10 is estimated to be 
                                                   
9 The US and those countries have agreed to alternative measures. For example, the US and Korea 
have agreed to a steel quota amounting to 70 per cent of the average US steel imports from Korea 
during 2015-2017. This may have an impact equivalent to certain tariffs on US steel imports from 
Korea, even if Korea were exempted from the US steel tariff hikes. 
10 In this paper, the estimated impact on the trade balance for all industries includes the impact 
on both goods and services, which is a better indicator of external balance as a whole looking at 
national savings and investment balance. 
(%, * Billion US dollars)
 Imports Exports Trade Balance* Production
AGR 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4
MNG -0.3 -1.7 1.7 -0.4
PFD 0.9 -1.8 -1.9 -0.3
TXL 0.7 -2.2 -1.4 -0.8
CHM 0.4 -1.3 -5.7 -0.5
MTL -45.9 -14.2 59.4 9.0
MVH 1.1 -3.4 -6.6 -1.9
ELE 0.6 -5.1 -8.5 -3.0
OME 2.3 -5.8 -23.6 -2.2
OMF 1.5 -3.7 -5.2 -0.9
CNS 0.7 -2.4 -0.2 -0.4
EGW 1.9 -2.7 -0.2 0.1
T_T 0.4 -1.1 -1.2 -0.2
OSP 0.6 -1.4 -4.1 -0.2
OSG 0.1 -1.3 -0.8 0.0
Total -2.0 -3.4 1.3 -0.2
Source: Author's simulations
Table 3-A Impact of US metal tariff hikes: US sectors
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a relatively small 1.3 billion US dollars. Meanwhile, consumer real income and 
consumption would be adversely affected by those higher import costs. US total 
production is estimated to decrease by 0.2 per cent rather than increase. US real GDP is 
also estimated to decrease by 0.2 per cent. It is shown here that import tariffs could protect 
the relevant sectors but would have a negative impact on the economy at the macro level. 
 
 The impact of US metal tariff hikes on other economies at the macro level could 
be limited, as in the case of the US. It is estimated that China’s metal trade balance would 
deteriorate by 9.3 billion US dollars, but that China’s trade balance deterioration for all 
industries would be limited to 1.0 billion US dollars. EU’s trade balance deterioration for 
all industries (0.1 billion US dollars) would also be minor compared with the deterioration 
of its metal trade balance (9.3 billion US dollars). Meanwhile, metal production in Canada 
and Mexico could decrease by more than 10 per cent but their real GDP would decrease 
by less than 1 per cent (see Table 3-B).  
 
 
 2) The costs of protectionism 
 
 On May 23, 2018, on the instructions of US President Trump, USDOC initiated 
an investigation of US imports of automobiles under section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962. On the other hand, several countries have made notification to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) concerning US steel and aluminum tariffs. Future 
(%, * Billion US dollars)
Metal Total Metal Real GDP
JPN -2.8 0.0 -0.8 0.0
CHN -9.3 -1.0 -0.4 0.0
KOR -2.8 0.0 -1.5 0.0
ASA -1.2 -0.1 -0.7 0.0
IND -0.9 0.0 -0.5 0.0
AUS -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0
NZL -0.1 0.0 -0.7 0.0
USA 59.4 1.3 9.0 -0.2
CAN -10.4 1.0 -13.7 -0.3
MEX -6.0 0.3 -11.2 -0.7
ARG -0.2 0.0 -1.7 0.0
BRA -2.0 0.1 -1.4 -0.1
EUM -9.3 -0.1 -0.9 0.0
RUS -1.8 -0.6 -1.3 -0.1
Source: Author's simulations
Table 3-B Impact of US metal tariff hikes by country
Trade Balance* Production
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developments remain to be seen. In light of this situation, the potential impact of emergent 
protectionism is considered here. 
 
 Trade barriers including tariffs have fallen over time. According to World Bank’s 
“World Development Indicators,” 11  the 2012 average weighted mean tariff for all 
products in the world was 2.9 per cent, ranging between 1.7 per cent on average for high 
income countries and 9.6 per cent on average for low income countries. In this paper, the 
magnitude of tariff hikes on all goods is mechanically assumed to be 10 per cent in the 
model simulations below, in light of the levels of remaining tariffs in global trade. As a 
matter of fact, 25 per cent US tariff hikes have not yet been applied to all products. 
 
 It is estimated that if the US were to add a 10 per cent tariff on US imports of all 
goods from all countries, the US trade balance would be least affected but US real GDP12 
would decrease by 0.7 per cent. Mexico and Canada would lose more than the US, 3.7 
and 0.9 per cent respectively. On the other hand, Japan (0.1 per cent), China (0.2 per cent) 
and the EU (0.2 per cent) would lose less (see Chart 2).  
 
 In addition, a breakdown of the impact on US real GDP suggests that the impact 
of US tariffs on imports from China would be the largest (0.20 per cent), followed by that 
                                                   
11 http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/6.6 
12 A conventional CGE model measurement of economic welfare is equivalent variation (EV). 
However, the impact on real GDP is discussed in this paper, which may be much more familiar 
to policy makers and others as a representative indicator of macroeconomic income and 
production. 
Source: Author's simulations
Chart 2 Impact of US tariff hikes
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
(%)
-3.7%
11 
 
on imports from the EU (0.14 per cent). By sector, the impact of US tariffs on the imports 
of minerals (0.17 per cent), electronic equipment (0.14 per cent), motor vehicles and parts 
(0.12 per cent) and other machinery and equipment (0.20 per cent) would be larger than 
that on metals (0.08 per cent) and other commodities. The impact of US tariffs on the 
import of metals, discussed in the previous section, would be around a tenth of that on 
imports of all goods.  
 
  Moreover, it is estimated that if import tariffs were hiked by 10 per cent 
worldwide, global trade would decrease by 17.2 per cent and global real GDP would 
decrease by 2.3 per cent. The estimated magnitude of this impact is closer to those of 
earlier studies (IMF (2016); PC (2017a)). Three estimates, one reported here and two 
others, IMF (2016) and PC (2017a), coincidentally found a similar impact of one 
percentage point higher; worldwide import prices would lower global trade by 1.5 to 1.7 
per cent and global output by 0.2 per cent (average figures, see Table 4). That said, the 
details of the methodology, including the structure of the model used, may vary among 
Source: Author's simulations
Chart 3-A Impact of worldwide tariff hikes by country: Real GDP
-10.0
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
(%)
(%)
Assumptions
Trade Output
IMF 5 % tariff and 5 % non-tariff measures -16 * -2 *
PC 15 % tariff -22 ** -3 **
Kawasaki 10% tariff -17.1 ** -2.3 **
Note: * In the long run, ** estimates by a static model
Source: IMF (2016), PC (2017a) and author's simulations
Table 4 Comparison of impact of worldwide higher import prices
Outcomes
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the three estimates. The likely magnitude of the impact would be interpreted as lying 
within a certain range, as discussed later. 
 
 The impact of worldwide tariff hikes would vary widely by country; it would be 
much more serious for Mexico (8.8 per cent) and ASEAN (7.1 per cent) than for the US 
(0.4 per cent), Japan (0.9 per cent) and China (2.0 per cent) (see Chart 3-A). US real GDP 
loss would be smaller relatively than other countries compared with the case of tariff hikes 
by the US only. One key reason for the variation in impact across countries would be the 
effect of international capital movement, discussed in detail below. As a matter of fact, 
the impact of worldwide tariff hikes on trade balance would also vary by region, not just 
in terms of magnitude but also direction. Trade balance for all industries is estimated to 
improve in ASEAN and Mexico but to deteriorate in China and the US (see Chart 3-B). 
This suggests that capital balance would deteriorate in ASEAN and Mexico but improve 
in China and the US. 
 
 This would have key policy implications. Trade deficits themselves would not 
necessarily be of much concern given the somewhat compensatory benefits of 
international capital inflows. US sector by sector trade deficits have been associated with 
larger inflows of foreign direct investment, which have created more jobs in the US 
domestic market. On the other hand, possible capital outflows would exaggerate the 
adverse effects of tariff hikes. Those impacts would be watched carefully for ASEAN, 
Mexico and others, i.e. for those who have been hit by serious financial crises in the past 
due to capital flight. 
 
Source: Author's simulations
Chart 3-B Impact of worldwide tariff hikes by country: Trade balance
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 The impact of worldwide tariff hikes would also vary by sector. The impact 
would be larger for machinery and equipment including motor vehicles and parts (3.5 per 
cent) and electronic equipment (3.4 per cent) than for agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
(1.2 per cent) and processed foods (1.7 per cent) (see Chart 4). The impact would be larger 
in the sector in which substitution elasticity among regions and income elasticity of 
domestic expenditure are higher.  
 
 
 V. Sensitivity of endogenous labor and capital 
 
 It may be important here to consider again the question as to whether or not 
protectionism could save jobs. Many conventional CGE model simulations have assumed 
that labor could move among the sectors within the regions, but the total employment of 
an individual region would remain unchanged. Therefore, there is no estimate here of the 
impact of changes in employment and labor at the macro level. In this chapter, the 
sensitivity of endogenous labor supply is investigated relative to endogenous capital 
effects. 
 
 The GTAP model has two major production endowments,13 capital and labor. 
Endogenous capital accumulation effects have been incorporated in numerous studies 
following the methodology in Francois et al. (1996), which “explores trade policy and 
                                                   
13  Other production endowments are land for agriculture sectors and national resources for 
forestry, fisheries and mining sectors. 
Source: Author's simulations
Chart 4 Impact of worldwide tariff hikes by sector
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investment linkages in the GTAP Model.” That exploration is carried out “under 
alternative steady-state closure rules linking trade to consumption, production, and 
investment, and emphasizing the general equilibrium nature of capital accumulation 
mechanisms.” (Abstract). In this paper, these capital accumulation effects are 
incorporated in the major simulations, as discussed above. 
 
 On the other hand, the impact of trade policy on distribution has also been a 
matter of concern. There have been several cases of development of endogenizing labor 
and employment, e.g., Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat (2015) and the US International Trade 
Commission (ITC 2016) incorporated endogenous labor supply in response to changes in 
the real wage rate in their analyses of the impact of TPP Agreement. Cabinet Secretariat 
(2015) set elasticity at 0.8 based on literature surveys and provided a sensitivity analysis 
for the case of elasticity set at 0.4. USITC (2016) also reviewed the literature and used 
0.414 as the elasticity for all developed countries and 0.44 for all developing countries. 
 
 In this paper, the sensitivity of endogenous labor and capital are investigated for 
the case of a 10 per cent worldwide tariff hike, examining the following six versions of 
the model, employing the methodology discussed above. The property of international 
capital movement is also considered via the model MC2 without assuming that the 
expected rates of return on capital are not equalized but rather that rates of change in 
capital stock are common across the regions. 
                                                   
14 According to USITC (2016), “This is the same labor supply elasticity as the one calculated by 
the Congressional Budget Office for the United States” (p. 89). 
(%)
STD ML1 ML2 MC1 MC2 MLC
JPN -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.7 -2.8
CHN -0.9 -1.2 -1.4 -2.0 -2.4 -3.7
KOR -0.8 -1.4 -1.9 -4.1 -2.3 -8.0
ASA -0.8 -1.5 -2.0 -7.1 -2.4 -11.8
IND -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -1.8 -2.5
AUS -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 -1.6 -2.9
NZL -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -2.4 -1.8 -5.9
USA -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.4
CAN -0.6 -1.7 -2.7 -2.5 -1.6 -6.2
MEX -0.5 -1.0 -1.3 -8.8 -2.6 -14.2
EUM -0.6 -1.3 -1.9 -3.8 -2.1 -8.9
RUS -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.4 -2.5 -3.3
World -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -2.3 -1.9 -5.1
Source: Author's simulations
Table 5-A Sensitivity of tariff hikes: Real GDP
15 
 
 STD: Fixed labor and capital 
 ML1: Endogenous labor with elasticity 0.4 and fixed capital 
 ML2: Endogenous labor with elasticity 0.8 and fixed capital. 
 MC1: Fixed labor and capital accumulation 
 MC2: Fixed labor and capital accumulation under alternative assumption 
 MLC: Endogenous labor with elasticity 0.8 and capital accumulation 
The MC1 model corresponds to that employed in the previous chapter. 
 
 First of all, it must be noted that the impact of tariff hikes on macro economy as 
measured in terms of changes in real GDP is estimated to be negative for endogenous 
labor supply models as well as for fixed labor supply models (see Table 5-A). The earlier 
key finding, that protectionism would be harmful to the economy at the macro level, is 
confirmed regardless of exogenous or endogenous labor supply in the framework of CGE 
model simulations.15 
 
 Second, the dynamic effects of trade policy through endogenous labor and 
capital are shown to be significant. The static version of the CGE model has often been 
criticized for underestimating the impact of trade policy, focusing on the impact of 
resource reallocation and the terms of trade effects but not giving consideration to the 
dynamic impact of economic growth effects. Moreover, the spillover effects of both 
endogenous labor and capital are shown to be much larger than the combined effect of 
endogenous labor and capital individually. Global real GDP is estimated (via the MLC 
model) to decrease by 5.1 per cent, which is much larger than the simple sum of the 
estimated impacts under the ML2 model (1.2 per cent) and the MC1 model (2.3 per 
cent).16 
 
 Third, such dynamic effects appear to vary widely among countries in the case 
of endogenous capital but not so widely in the case of endogenous labor, according to the 
results of current versions of model simulations used in this paper. The differences in 
impact on real GDP are estimated to be almost proportional to the size of the labor supply 
elasticity of real wage and those variations among countries are shown to be limited. On 
the other hand, those variations among countries are indicated to be larger with 
endogenous capital. The MC1 model estimate of impact on global real GDP (2.3 per cent) 
is five times larger than the STD model impact (0.5 per cent). This ratio is shown to be 
                                                   
15 Francois, J., L. M. Baughman and D. Anthony (2018), for example, estimate that US steel and 
aluminum tariffs would increase employment in those industries but would decrease employment 
in other industries, resulting in a job loss at the total industries level. 
16 The estimates of the impact of lowering global trade vary relatively little among the six 
versions of the model (14.5 to 20.2 per cent). 
16 
 
smaller in Japan (3 times), China (2 times) and the US (3 times) but larger in ASEAN (9 
times), and particularly large in Mexico (17 times). 
 
 The above difference between the endogenous labor and endogenous capital 
models is explained by the different behaviors of labor and capital. As mentioned above, 
the relative changes in labor among countries are shown to be limited, but those in capital 
are much larger under the MC1 model (see Table 5-B). As discussed above, this would 
largely be due to the general equilibrium mechanism of international capital movements. 
The differences in estimated impact among the countries are suggested to be less 
significant for the MC2 model, in which such international capital movements are limited. 
International capital movements would be driven by differences in induced changes in 
the expected rate of return on capital, which in turn depend on capital income ratios 
among countries.17 
 
 In other words, if international movement of labor and equalization of changes 
in real wage among the regions are introduced into the model, the behavior of the 
endogenous labor model would be substantially different from that of the current versions 
of model simulations used here. International adjustment of labor market would take a 
much longer time than that of capital market; this is a future issue for the development of 
the CGE model. 
 
                                                   
17 PC (2017b) also discusses the effects of alternative capital closures on the CGE modeling of 
trade policies with a PC Global model. 
(%)
ML1 ML2 MLC MC1 MC2 MLC
JPN -0.6 -1.0 -1.8 -1.5 -3.3 -3.6
CHN -0.7 -1.1 -1.8 -2.6 -3.3 -4.2
KOR -1.4 -2.3 -4.3 -7.0 -3.3 -10.7
ASA -1.8 -3.0 -6.1 -11.9 -3.3 -16.2
IND -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -2.5 -3.3 -3.6
AUS -0.3 -0.5 -1.7 -1.8 -3.3 -4.3
NZL -0.7 -1.3 -3.3 -4.5 -3.3 -8.4
USA -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -0.9 -3.3 -2.3
CAN -1.8 -3.3 -3.9 -5.7 -3.3 -9.1
MEX -1.3 -2.2 -7.1 -13.3 -3.3 -18.2
EUM -1.4 -2.5 -5.1 -6.8 -3.3 -12.0
RUS -0.2 -0.3 -1.3 -1.0 -3.3 -3.4
Source: Author's simulations
Table 5-B Sensitivity of tariff hikes: Labor and capital
Labor Capital
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 All in all, the CGE model sensitivity analysis suggests a wider range of estimated 
impacts of tariff hikes and trade policy. It would be useful to compare the impacts of 
various policy scenarios using the same version of the model rather than focusing on the 
absolute magnitude of the likely impact of a specific policy scenario. 
 
 
 VI. Concluding remarks 
 
 US import tariffs could protect the relevant US sectors but would have a negative 
impact on the economy at the macro level. This is confirmed by this paper’s sensitivity 
analysis of a CGE model with both endogenous and exogenous labor supply. This key 
policy finding could not be attributed to the conventional framework of fixed labor in a 
CGE model. 
 
 The CGE model sensitivity analysis also suggests that international capital 
movements would differentiate the impact of tariff hikes among countries. Trade deficits 
themselves would not necessarily be of much concern given the somewhat compensatory 
benefits of international capital inflows. On the other hand, possible capital outflows 
could exaggerate the adverse effects of tariff hikes. 
 
 It is estimated that for an import tariff hike of one percentage point worldwide, 
global trade would decrease by around 1.7 per cent and global GDP would decrease by 
around 0.2 per cent. It is of concern that emergent protectionism would reduce the growth 
of both global trade and the global economy. 
 
 The above CGE model estimates are applied to an analysis of the general 
equilibrium mechanism of supply and demand in goods markets. It must be noted that in 
the short term, the impact could be much larger than indicated here, depending on the 
response in markets including the financial, foreign exchange and commodity markets. 
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